“…transcendence as the erasure of the other”

I realize this last phrase resists the notion that Levinas has of transcendence. Levinas wants to reconstitute metaphysics. He wants to re-think transcendence along the lines of Descartes’ idea of infinity. It is as if he wants to find the authenticity of metaphysics. For Levinas, metaphysics was always the thinking of the other. “The metaphysical desire tends towards something else entirely, toward the absolute other.” (Totality and Infinity, page 33, paperback) I understand his intentions here but I have always had some reservations concerning Levinas and metaphysics.

Metaphysics comes to post-modernity as historical, a canon. It has certainly taken radical turns from the Greeks, to Neo-Platonism, to Augustine, to Descartes, to Hegel, to Nietzsche and post-modernism. All these and others that have touched Metaphysics have moved it towards post-modernity. We, as historical beings have received this history in many ways that are pre-cognitive in Heidegger’s terms. Worldhood is certainly forged through the furnace of Metaphysics.

Post-modernity has looked upon metaphysics suspiciously as ‘logocentrism’, the canonical reading of power, the evil genius of Nietzsche’s Christianity and the alienation of labor. Levinas, as an anarchist communist understood these difficulties and yet was able to see beyond the barriers of historical narrative. In validating metaphysics as the residue of radical alterity he also takes up the historical burden placed upon metaphysics.

Certainly the reflections of metaphysics as power and the end of metaphysics want us to hear the all too human refrain of transcendence, the lack of anything that Levinas would want to hold to as radical alterity. To some extent this burden of metaphysics has been handed over to us. For some God still stands as the heir of metaphysics. However, the stand is defensive. Any Christian today will take up the cross of mistrust and suspicion. True, this also happened at the beginning of Christianity but starting with Roman Christendom onwards through the 19th century Christians were mainstream for much of the West and heresy or worse was reserved for the few that questioned its supremacy. The metaphysics of Christianity had been thought by a majority as the ‘science’ of the Dark and Middle Ages. Its truth was absolutely certain and informed culture.

The death of God that Nietzsche discussed and the end of metaphysics is not something imputed to it but something observed from it. Its power has been reduced to ‘personal relationship with Jesus’ as opposed to state religion. It no longer divines truth; science has taken its place. This does mean that Christians are not still under the spell of Christianity but it does point to their need to defend God over and against science. The post-modern who would be Christian is on guard, reclusive from the state. Evolution and global warming are denied. ‘Life’ is not taken in a biological sense but in a metaphysical sense as in the anti-abortionists who call themselves ‘pro-life’. This defensive stance would have been foreign to the average peasant in the dark ages. At the end of metaphysics we understand the darkness of God, the horrific violence of God, the human subjugation of God. Even Christians that would defend God from these assaults feel like they must defend the ‘true’ God from the weight of these accusations.

Even with all this Levinas peered deeply into metaphysics and saw the other. He felt the wonder of what metaphysics had always aimed at, the infinity that made metaphysics possible. However, as post-modern don’t we carry the ‘sameness’, the totalizing, the appeal to origin (arche’), the sin of presence, the effacement of radical alterity in our horizons that is said in the essence of metaphysics? The ‘saying’ that is otherwise than being is a still small voice but fraught with historical noise.

For us science has become the surrogate of metaphysics. It has taken careful steps to avoid the pitfalls of metaphysics. However, in so doing it has asked us to lower our horizons, our expectations. We are asked to relegate the questions of metaphysics to the junk pile of history. All the while, science has carried the banner of truth it has also left a gaping hole where metaphysics once stood. We, who live in the aftermath of this clash, even if not Christian, feel the crush of meaning, the cry of existentialism, the gasp of godlessness. The reduction to mere human has replaced the metaphysical drama of the titans, the gods and the eternal stakes that surround us. Here in this smallness we live and move and have our being.

Levinas wants to bring value again to metaphysics as what he gleams to be its kernel, the other. The other here does not mean to ‘set man on the throne’ or some such nonsense. At the same time that Levinas reconstitutes metaphysics as the radical alterity of the face of the other he also want to dethrone ‘man’ as a product of sameness, totality, tyranny. ‘Man’ as taken into metaphysics is understood, devalued and leveled off. Man is ‘enframed’ as standing reserve, thought in the manner of things, reduced to one among many of what is already known. ‘Man’ already marks the loss of human being. Levinas in thinking of the other wants to lose that ‘plastic cast’ of the face of the other. He wants to re-think the other as what can never enter into the light of being but casts off rays as history and language. Instead of a phenomenology of what shows itself he finds an absolute refusal to show, to be taken up in thought – except as retreat, as a darkness not shown in light. Paul Valery along with Hegel might say. “…but in order to render the light, you need a somber moiety of shade.” Levinas would content that as there is a real difference in ‘shade’ and death there is a real difference in ‘closedness’ and the face of the other. This difference is more than one of kind, it is not temporally commensurate, it is dia-chrony, a time not mine – not one kind among other kinds – but an-archical, without origin. This reminds us of the chaos of Hesiod but without the neutrality – the he or she that faces me. In this, Levinas wants to situate the history of metaphysics.

However, from post-modernity can we reconstitute metaphysics radically? Can we purge it of its madness and set it on an ‘other’ setting. Can we find another start from the Greeks? There are many starts in the Greeks. Do we have the choice to lay aside metaphysics? -Probably not. As the snake in Zarathustra don’t we need to bite of the head to grow another tail? The snake is mortally wounded but eternal recurrence has made sublime in-ways as trace, as radical alterity, tangential but not neutral, an-archical but not nothing, dia-chronos but not a-temporal. The eternal God of metaphysics has been dethroned but the spirit doggedly remains. I am not sure we can re-constitute metaphysics but we must. We face a recent turn towards heterogeny. Can we ignore science, the new unconscious, the m-verse, the God-particle? Has science surpassed the ‘mere’ of correctness and mathematical projects? Can we ignore difference, the trace, the spoiling of opposites, the deposition of dualities – the middle way of Greek thought – the kairos the interrupts chrony? Post-modernism thinks difference as before opposition, as before thesis/antithesis/aufhebung. This difference does not ‘lift up’ or sublate. This difference does not transform or transport. This difference cannot reduce to neutrality and the light and darkness that produce it. This anachronism is laid upon us reluctantly by the corpse of metaphysics that we are. Transcendence as the erasure of the other nonetheless preserves the other in its erasure – in this we bear our post-modernity.