What is a “Postmodern Conservative”?

January 2, 2012

There used to be a conservative website, some of its content is still around, called ā€œThe Postmodern Conservativeā€. I read a little content from this site as I am a little intrigued how one could maintain the conjecture of a ā€˜postmodern conservative’. On the surface, this is an oxymoron. Perhaps it is intended ironically. It is tantamount to thinking of Nietzsche’s nihilism and Christianity together in positive terms. Postmodern thinking seeks to overturn constructionism and its resulting epistemological result, structuralism. Postmoderism cannot be thought as a coherent, autonomous and positive philosophy. It is a symbiotic philosophy. It preys on structure and narrative. It is a methodology that deconstructs structure based on the specific structure’s own content, its counter narratives that contradict and undermine its canonical determinations. No philosophical system of thought is immune from the oxidizing effect of its most ardent iron. Deconstruction is the tool of the nihilist. In light of this, how would a ā€˜conservative’ postmodernists be thought except as ironically?

Their claim is further confused in their assertion that a ā€˜conservative’ postmodernist is more coherent that a ā€˜liberal’ postmodernist. This is like thinking that a Lucifer is more Christ-like than an Antichrist. What would one ā€˜conserve’ as a postmodernist? Why would the content of their conservation be immune from their own devices? How could a postmodern recommend ā€˜conservative’ content over ā€˜liberal’ content? Haven’t we established a canon, a ā€˜logocentrism’, by maintaining conservatism? If the thought is one of a sort of Darwinian mind-beating as opposed to the more conventional chest-beating in the belief that survival of the fittest is established, these folks should re-read Derrida’s essay on ā€œForce and Significationā€ in ā€œWriting and Differenceā€. Derrida writes, ā€œTo comprehend the structure of a becoming, the form of a force, is to lose meaning by gaining it.ā€ 1) If the structure of ā€˜conservatism’ is meaningful and is to be recommended over ā€˜liberalism’ then, for deconstruction, its meaning is lost at the same time that it is achieved.

If, on the other hand, ā€˜conservatism’ here is meant to designate brute force, mystification of raw power, then power becomes that text that Derrida writes of when he states, ā€œTo say that force is the origin of the phenomenon is to say nothingā€ 2) He goes on to state that Hegel clearly demonstrates that force is a tautology. Force can only assert itself. Force and language amount to the same thing, the same identity. Nothing new or different is added in thinking either word. To rejoin this notion to conservatism is reminiscent of Ayn Rand and her elitist dogma; a tautology of power makes right, history IS the narrative of the conqueror. Without regard to any moral or ethical disjoins, this assertion merely redundantly marks itself. Its only claim is to force or the structuralism that it establishes. To deconstruct its specific narrative is the task of postmodernism. To deconstruct deconstructionism is to revert to constructionism and thus re-establish (or never have de-established) its myopic insistence, its force. In other words, it is to say nothing using a lot of words. While this trend has certainly not been alien to philosophy it seems to rise to the level of infinite nonsense in the thought of a ā€œPostmodern Conservativeā€.

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1) Writing and Difference, Force and Signification, page 26 (paperback)
2) Ibid, page 26 (bottom)

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